S. Hrg. 109-311: Abel Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing

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So I went to my FBI contact on The 17th of November and asked to meet with the agents in the WFO [Washington Field Office] who worked bin Laden. From the FBI to the DIA and the CIA there has been an affirmative attempt to cover up the mistakes of the past—of which Ali Mohamed was perhaps one of the most egregious examples,” he said. Weldon went on to claim that he had personally presented the chart to then-Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley in 2001, days after the 9/11 attacks.

Tony Shaffer, the book's author, and the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, Philip Zelikow, removed". of supervised release of five years on Counts One, Two, Three and Five and three years’ supervised release on Count Six? I said, ‘The Russians are convinced that this guy Kric can give us information that will allow us to get Milosevic to free those pilots. Eventually they would identify Aden Yemen as a key al Qaeda “hotspot” within days of the Cole bombing. It was later reported by Newsweek and the Washington Times that al-Bayoumi may have been the recipient of funds sent ito his wife indirectly from Princess Haifa bin Faisal, wife of the then-Saudi ambassador to the U.Dina Corsi, an FBI analyst from Headquarters comes up [to New York] with a CIA officer,” says Cloonan, “and they show three pictures of this meeting in Kuala Lumpur that CIA has known the significance of for months and they say they can’t share it with us. The consequence was that as we got closer to 9/11 we weren’t getting smarter about the al Qaeda threat, we were having blinders put on. Gorton also asserted that "the wall" was a long-standing policy that had resulted from the Church Committee in the 1970s, and that the policy only prohibits transfer of certain information from prosecutors to the intelligence services and never prohibited information flowing in the opposite direction.

Shaffer says that Able Danger was “the military version of Alec Station,” the CIA’s unit tasked with collecting al Qaeda-related intelligence. As early as 1998, the NSA had picked up references to al-Midhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi and his brother Salem, who would also become a suicide hijacker on 9/11. In December 2006, an investigation by the US Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that assertions could not be confirmed. In an interview with Fox News, Smith reported that the project had involved analysis of data from a large number of public sources and 20 to 30 individuals. Five witnesses who had worked on Able Danger and had been questioned by the Defense Department's Inspector General later told investigative journalists that their statements to the IG were distorted by investigators in the final IG's report, or the report omitted essential information that they had provided.org, Princess Haifa began sending cashier’s checks to Majeda Dwiekat, the Jordanian wife of one Osama Basnan, a Saudi living in San Diego. Shaffer and other Able Danger team members, some of whom were never interviewed by the IG's office nor the 9/11 commission. Alleged Misconduct by Senior DOD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Ali Mohamed was living proof that the FBI, under three presidential administrations, had been deceived by an asset expert at playing one intelligence agency off against another, even as he betrayed his adopted country for the jihad.

Within days of bringing them from Los Angeles, al-Bayoumi throws a welcoming party that introduces them to the local Muslim community. On February 14, 2006, Congressmen Curt Weldon charged that contrary to testimony, not all the data on Able Danger had been destroyed. Lucas O'Hara of Grizzly Forge has teamed up with BRCC for a badass, exclusive Shirt Club T-shirt design featuring his most popular knife and tiomahawk. When asked whether the information could have prevented the attack on September 11 of 2001, he answered that he would not speculate to that, but that the information might have been useful.

Again, this connect wasn’t surprising, since the CIA had earlier tracked Khallad bin Atash, the one-legged Embassy bombing plotter with heavy Yemeni ties.

He was saying, ‘Yes Mohamed Atef asked me with Zawahiri and bin Laden’s blessing to do the surveillance on the U.An incredibly detailed profile that I got almost overnight from this tiny under-funded operation on an army base, when our own CIA didn’t seem to have a clue who Kric was. Then the LIWA people show you a link chart with a picture of this fellow Ali Mohamed so close to bin Laden. You’ve got this embarrassment of riches with probative al Qaeda intelligence—the names of four of the September 11th hijackers in the spring of 2000, almost a year and a half before the attacks.